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Abstract
In this paper1 we explore several contexts where an ad-
versary has an upper hand over the defender by using
special hardware in an attack. These include password
processing, hard-drive protection, cryptocurrency min-
ing, resource sharing, code obfuscation, etc.
We suggest memory-hard computing as a generic
paradigm, where every task is amalgamated with a cer-
tain procedure requiring intensive access to RAM both in
terms of size and (very importantly) bandwidth, so that
transferring the computation to GPU, FPGA, and even
ASIC brings little or no cost reduction. Cryptographic
schemes that run in this framework become egalitarian
in the sense that both users and attackers are equal in the
price-performance ratio conditions.
Based on existing schemes like Argon2 and the re-
cent generalized-birthday proof-of-work, we suggest a
generic framework and two new schemes:
• MTP, a memory-hard Proof-of-Work based on the
memory-hard function with fast verification and
short proofs. It can be also used for memory-hard
time-lock puzzles. The MTP-Argon2 requires 2 GB
of RAM to make a proof, and can be initialized and
start producing proofs in less than 1 second – perfor-
mance hardly beaten by competitors like Equihash
for the same amount of RAM.
• MHE, the concept of memory-hard encryption,
which utilizes available RAM to strengthen the en-
cryption for the low-entropy keys (allowing to bring
back 6 letter passwords).
The MTP PoW has been tweaked in October-
November 2017 to withstand certain recently found at-
tacks [10, 16].
1This is a revised version of a paper published at USENIX Security
Symposium in August 2016.
Keywords: MTP, MHE, Argon2, memory-hard,
asymmetric, proof-of-work, botnets, encryption, time-
lock puzzles.
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Historically attackers have had more resources than de-
fenders, which is still mostly true. Whether it is se-
cret key recovery or document forgery, the attackers are
ready to spend tremendous amount of computing power
to achieve the goal. In some settings it is possible to
make most attacks infeasible by simply setting the key
length to 128 bits and higher. In other settings the secret
is limited and the best the defender can do is to increase
the time needed for the attack, but not to render the attack
impossible.
Passwords, typically stored in a hashed form, are a
classical example. As people tend to choose passwords
of very low entropy, the security designers added unique
salts and then increased the number of hash iterations.
In response the attackers switched to dedicated hardware
for password cracking, so that the price of single pass-
word recovery dropped dramatically, sometimes by a few
orders of magnitude.
A similar situation occurred in other contexts. The
Bitcoin cryptocurrency relies on continuous preimage
search for the SHA-256 hash function, which is much
cheaper on custom ASICs, consuming up to 30,000
times 2 less energy per solution than most efficient x86
laptops [2]. Eventually, the original concept of an egali-
tarian cryptocurrency [31] vanished with the emergence
of huge and centralized mining pools.
Related problems include password-based key deriva-
tion for hard-drive encryption, where the data confiden-
tiality directly depends on the password entropy, and
2We compare 232 hashes per joule on the best ASICs with 217
hashes per joule on the most efficient x86-laptops
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where offline attack is exceptionally easy once the drive
is stolen. Similar situation arise in the resource sharing
and spam countermeasures. In the latter it is proposed
that every user presents a certain proof (often called
proof-of-work), which should be too expensive for spam-
mers to generate on a large scale. Yet another setting
is that of code obfuscation, in which powerful reverse-
engineering/de-compilation tools can be used in order to
lift the proprietary code or secrets embedded in the soft-
ware.
1.2 Egalitarian computing
Our idea is to remedy the disparity between ordinary
users and adversaries/cheaters, where latter could use
botnets, GPU, FPGA, ASICs to get an advantage and run
a cheaper attack. We call it egalitarian computing as it
should establish the same price for a single computation
unit on all platforms, so that the defender’s hardware is
optimal both for attack and defence. Equipped with egal-
itarian crypto schemes, defenders may hope to be on par
with the most powerful attackers.
The key element of our approach is large (in size) and
intensive (in bandwidth) use of RAM as a widely avail-
able and rather cheap unit for most defenders. In turn,
RAM is rather expensive on FPGA and ASIC3, and slow
on GPU, at least compared to memoryless computing
tasks. All our schemes use a lot of memory and a lot
of bandwidth — almost as much as possible.
We suggest a single framework for this concept and
concrete schemes with an unique combination of fea-
tures. In the future, adoption of our concept could al-
low a homogenization of computing resources, a simpli-
fied security analysis, and relaxed security requirements.
When all attackers use the same hardware as defend-
ers, automated large-scale attacks are no longer possible.
Shorter keys, shorter passwords, faster and more trans-
parent schemes may come back to use.
Related work The idea of extensive memory use in the
context of spam countermeasures dates back at least to
2003 [6, 17] and was later refined in [19]. Fast memory-
intensive hash functions were proposed first by Percival
in 2009 [33] and later among the submissions of the Pass-
word Hashing Competition. Memory-intensive proofs-
3The memory effect on ASICs can be illustrated as follows. A
compact 50-nm DRAM implementation [21] takes 500 mm2 per GiB,
which is equivalent to about 15000 10 MHz SHA-256 cores in the best
Bitcoin 40-nm ASICs [1] and is comparable to a CPU size. Therefore,
an algorithm requiring 1 GiB for 1 minute would have the same AT cost
as an algorithm requiring 242 hash function calls, whereas the latter can
not finish on a PC even in 1 day. In other words, the use of memory can
increase the AT cost by a factor of 1000 and more at the same time-cost
for the desktop user.
of-work have been studied both in theory [20] and prac-
tice [7, 38].
Paper structure We describe the goals of our con-
cept and give a high level overview in Section 2. Then
we describe existing applications where this approach
is implicitly used: password hashing and cryptocur-
rency proofs of work (Section 3). We present our own
progress-free Proof-of-Work MTP with fast verification,
which can also serve as a memory-hard time-lock puz-
zle, in Section 4. The last Section 5 is devoted to the
novel concept of memory-hard encryption, where we
present our scheme MHE aimed to increase the secu-
rity of password-based disk encryption. Appendix B de-
scribes the differences with the original MTP v1.0 paper.
2 Egalitarian computing as framework
2.1 Goal
Our goal is to alter a certain functionH in order to max-
imize its computational cost on the most efficient archi-
tecture – ASICs, while keeping the running time on the
native architecture (typically x86) the same. We ignore
the design costs due to nontransparent prices, but instead
estimate the running costs by measuring the time-area
product [9, 37]. On ASICs the memory size M translates
into certain area A. The ASIC running time T is deter-
mined by the length of the longest computational chain
and by the ASIC memory latency.
Suppose that an attacker wants to compute H using
only a fraction αM of memory for some α < 1. Using
some tradeoff specific toH , he has to spend C(α) times
as much computation and his running time increases by
the factor D(α) (here C(α) may exceed D(α) as the at-
tacker can parallelize the computation). In order to fit the
increased computation into time, the attacker has to place
C(α)
D(α) additional cores on chip. Therefore, the time-area
product changes from AT1 to ATα as
ATα = A ·
(
α+
βC(α)
D(α)
)
T ·D(α) =
= AT1(αD(α)+C(α)β ), (1)
where β is the fraction of the original memory occu-
pied by a single computing core. If the tradeoff re-
quires significant communication between the comput-
ing cores, the memory bandwidth limit Bwmax may also
increase the running time. In practice we will have
D(α) ≥ C(α) ·Bw/Bwmax, where Bw is the bandwidth
for α = 1.
Definition 1 We call function F memory-hard (w.r.t.
M) if any algorithm A that computes H using αM
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memory has the computation-space tradeoff C(α) where
C() is at least a superlinear function of 1/α .
It is known [23] that any function whose computation is
interpreted as a directed acyclic graph with T vertices
of constant in-degree, can be computed using O( TlogT )
space, where the constant in O() depends on the degree.
However, for concrete hash functions very few tradeoff
strategies have been published, for example [11].
2.2 Framework
Our idea is to combine a certain computation H with a
memory-hard function F . This can be done by modify-
ingH using input fromF (amalgamation) or by trans-
forming its code to an equivalent one (obfuscation).
The amalgamation is used as follows. The execution
of H is typically a sequence of smaller steps Hi, i < T ,
which take the output Vi−1 from the previous step and
produce the next output Vi. For our purpose we need an-
other primitive, a memory-hard function F , which fills
the memory with some blocks X [i], i < T . We suggest
combiningH withF , for example like:
H ′ = H ′T ◦H ′T−1 ◦ · · · ◦H ′1,
where
H ′i (Vi−1) = H(Vi−1⊕X [i−1]).
Depending on the application, we may also modify X [i]
as a function of Vi−1 so that it is impossible to precom-
puteF . The idea is that any computation ofH ′ should
use T blocks of memory, and if someone wants to use
less, the memory-hardness property would impose com-
putational penalties on him. This approach will also
work well for any code that uses nonces or randomness
produced by PRNG. PRNG could then be replaced by (or
intermixed with the output of) F .
The obfuscation principle works as follows. Consider
a compiler producing an assembly code for some func-
tion H . We make it to run a memory-hard function F
on a user-supplied input I (password) and produce cer-
tain number of memory blocks. For each if-statement of
the form
if x then A
else B
the compiler computes a memory-hard bit bi which is
extracted from the block X [i] (the index can also depend
on the statement for randomization) and alters the state-
ment as
if x⊕bi then A
else B
for bi = 0 and
if x⊕bi then B
else A
for bi = 1. This guarantees that the program will have
to run F at least once (the bits bi can be cached if this
if-statement is used multiple times, ex. in a loop).
Accessing the memory block from a random memory
location for each conditional statement in practice would
slow down the program too much, so compiler can per-
form a tradeoff depending on the length of the program,
the number of conditional statements in it and accord-
ing to a tunable degree of required memory-hardness
for a program. Memory-hard bits could be mixed into
opaque predicates or other code obfuscation constructs
like code-flattening logic.
We note that in order for a program to run correctly,
the user needs to supply correct password for F , even
though the source code of the program is public. A smart
decompiler, however, when supplied with the password,
can obtain clean version of the program by running F
only once.
Our schemes described in the further text use the amal-
gamation principle only, so we leave the research direc-
tions in obfuscation for future work.
3 Egalitarian computing in applications
In this section we outline several applications, where
memory-hard functions are actively used in order to
achieve egalitarian computing.
3.1 Password hashing with a memory-hard
function
The typical setting for the password hashing is as fol-
lows. A user selects a password P and submit it to the
authentication server with his identifier Id. The server
hashes P and unique salt S with some function F , and
stores (Id,S,F (P,S)) in the password file. The common
threat is the password file theft, so that an attacker can
try the passwords from his dictionary file D and check if
any of them yields the stolen hash. The unique S ensures
that the hashes are tried one-by-one.
Following massive password cracking attacks that use
special hardware [28, 36], the security community initi-
ated the Password Hashing Competition [3] to select the
hash function that withstands the most powerful adver-
saries. The Argon2 hash function [12] has been recently
selected as the winner. We stress that the use of memory-
hard function for password hashing does not make the
dictionary attacks infeasible, but it makes them much
more expensive in terms of the single trial cost.
Definition and properties of Argon2 We use Argon2
in our new schemes, which are described in Sections 4
and 5. The original Argon2 design has been modified
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(with all differences explicitly mentioned below) to with-
stand more powerful adversaries in the Proof-of-work
setting. Here we outline the key elements of the Argon2
design that are used in our scheme. For more details and
their rationale we refer the reader to [12].
Argon2 takes P (password), S (salt), and possibly
some additional data U as inputs. It is parametrized
by the memory size T , number of iterations t, and the
available parallelism l. It fills T blocks of memory
X [1],X [2], . . . ,X [T ] (1 KiB each) and then overwrites
them (t − 1) times. Each block X [i] is generated using
internal compression function F , which takes X [i− 1],
X [φ(i)]. For t = 1 this works as follows, where H is the
256-bit Blake2b, H2048 is a 2048-bit hash function based
on H.
H0← H(P,S,U);
X [0]||X [1]← H2048(H0);
X [i]← F(X [i−1],X [φ(i)]), i > 1;
Out→ H(X [T −1]).
(2)
The indexing function φ(i) is defined separately for each
of two versions of Argon2: 2d and 2i. The Argon2d,
which we use in this paper, computes it as a function of
the previous block X [i−1].
The authors proved [12] that all the blocks are gen-
erated distinct assuming certain collision-resistant-like
properties of F . They also reported the performance of
0.7 cpb on the Haswell CPU with 4 threads, and 1.6 cpb
with 1 thread.
Multi-lane Argon2 Argon2 supports multithreading
by arranging its blocks into multiple p lanes and con-
structing the φ function so that only not so recent
blocks are referenced. The blocks are indexed in a two-
dimensional array with p rows and T/p columns. For
non-ambiguity, we suggest the following mapping be-
tween one- and two-dimensional representations:
ψ : [0;T −1]→ [0; p−1]× [0;T/p−1]; (3)
ψ(i) = (p · i/T, i mod (T/p)); (4)
ψ−1( j,k) = jT/p+ k. (5)
Tradeoff security of Argon2 Using the tradeoff algo-
rithm published in [11], the authors report the values
C(α) (average computational tree size) and D(α) (av-
erage tree depth) up to α = 1/7 with t = 1. It appears
that C(α) is exponential in α , whereas D(α) is linear.
3.2 Proofs of work
A proof-of-work scheme is a challenge-response proto-
col, where one party (Prover) has to prove (maybe prob-
abilistically) that it has performed a certain amount of
computation following a request from another party (Ver-
ifier). It typically relies on a computational problem
where a solution is assumed to have fixed cost, such as
the preimage search in the Bitcoin protocol and other
cryptocurrencies. Other applications may include spam
protection, where a proof-of-work is a certificate that is
easy to produce for ordinary sender, but hard to generate
in large quantities given a botnet (or more sophisticated
platform).
The proof-of-work algorithm must have a few proper-
ties to be suitable for cryptocurrencies:
• It must be amortization-free, i.e. producing q out-
puts forB should be q times as expensive;
• The solution must be short enough and verified
quickly using little memory in order to prevent DoS
attacks on the verifier.
• The time-space tradeoffs must be steep to prevent
any price-performance reduction.
• The time and memory parameters must be tunable
independently to sustain constant mining rate.
• To avoid a clever prover getting advantage over the
others the advertised algorithm must be the most ef-
ficient algorithm to date (optimization-freeness).
• The algorithm must be progress-free to prevent cen-
tralization: the mining process must be stochastic so
that the probability to find a solution grows steadily
with time and is non-zero for small time periods.
• Parallelized implementations must be limited by the
memory bandwidth.
As demonstrated in [13], almost any hard problem can
be turned into a proof-of-work, even though it is difficult
to fulfill all these properties. The well-known hard and
NP-complete problems are natural candidates, since the
best algorithms for them run in (sub)exponential time,
whereas the verification is polynomial. The proof-of-
work scheme Equihash [13] is built on the generalized-
birthday, or k-XOR, problem, which looks for a set of
α 12
1
3
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
C(α) 1.5 4 20.2 344 4660 218
D(α) 1.5 2.8 5.5 10.3 17 27
Table 1: Time and computation penalties for the ranking
tradeoff attack for Argon2d.
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n-bit strings that XOR to zero. The best existing algo-
rithm is due to Wagner [40]. This problem is particularly
interesting, as the time-space tradeoff steepness can be
adjusted by changing k, which does not hold, e.g., in hard
knapsacks.
Drawbacks of existing PoW We briefly discuss exist-
ing alternatives here. The first PoW schemes by Dwork
and Naor [18] were just computational problems with
fast verification such as the square root computation,
which do not require large memory explicitly. The sim-
plest scheme of this kind is Hashcash [8], where a par-
tial preimage to a cryptographic hash function is found
(the so called difficulty test). Large memory comes into
play in [17], where a random array is shared between the
prover and the verifier thus allowing only large-memory
verifiers. This condition was relaxed in [19], where su-
perconcentrators [34] are used to generate the array, but
the verifier must still hold large memory in the initial-
ization phase. Superconcentrators were later used in the
Proof-of-Space construction [20], which allows fast veri-
fication. However, the scheme [20] if combined with the
difficulty test is vulnerable to cheating (see Section 4.4
for more details) and thus can not be converted to a
progress-free PoW. We note that the superconcentrators
make both [19] and [20] very slow.
Ad-hoc but faster schemes started with scrypt [33],
but fast verification is possible only with rather low
amount of memory. Using more memory (say, using Ar-
gon2 [12]) with a difficulty test but verifying only a sub-
set of memory is prone to cheating as well (Section 4.4).
The scheme [13] is quite promising and is now em-
ployed in Zcash [24]. The fastest implementation re-
ported needs 0.5 second to get a proof that certifies the
memory allocation of 150 MiB. The performance for
higher memory requirements is expected to grow at least
linearly. As a result, the algorithm is not truly progress-
free: the probability that the solution for a-few-GiB-
memory-challenge is found within the first few seconds
is actually zero. It can be argued that this could stimulate
centralization among the miners.
Ethash, the PoW currently employed in
Ethereum [41], operates similarly to [17, 19]: it
generates a pseudo-random array once every few days,
and then makes a random walk over the entries until a
certain property is satisfied. The proofs are short but the
initialization stage takes several minutes nowadays. This
makes the Ethereum mining process more centralized
as a miner would have to skip a few blocks after he
joins. In addition, the ad-hoc nature of Ethash makes it
difficult to claim its memory-hardness. As the Ethash is
(before the inception of Casper) a widely deployed PoW,
we summarize its features and drawbacks here:
• It requires about 4 GB of RAM in the read-only
manner (ROM): once filled, it remains untouched
for days. Thus it is suitable for mining on platforms
with low write speed as writing is seldom required;
• Ethash is an ad-hoc design, there is no proof (or
even sketch) that it can not be handled with less
memory.
• When Ethash is used inside a multi-currency miner,
it might take significant time to switch between the
currencies causing profit loss.
• The verification is not totaly memoryless: a volume
of about 32 MiB is needed to verify the PoW.
Additional analysis of Ethash (somewhat outdated by
now) can be found in [30].
Finally, we mention schemes Momentum [26] and
Cuckoo cycle [38], which provide fast verification due
to their combinatorial nature. They rely on the mem-
ory requirements for the collision search (Momentum)
or graph cycle finding (Cuckoo). However, Momen-
tum is vulnerable to a sublinear time-space tradeoff [13],
whereas the first version of the Cuckoo scheme was bro-
ken in [7].
We summarize the properties of the existing proof-of-
work constructions in Table 2. The AT cost is estimated
for the parameters that enable 1-second generation time
on a PC.
4 MTP: Proofs of work and time-lock puz-
zles based on memory-hard function
In this section we present a novel proof-of-work algo-
rithm MTP (for Merkle Tree Proof) with fast verifica-
tion, which in particular solves the progress-free prob-
lem of [13]. Our approach is based on the memory-hard
function, and the concrete proposal involves Argon2.
Since fast memory-hard functions F such as Argon2
perform a lengthy chain of computations, but do not
solve any NP-like problem, it is not fast to verify that
Y is the output of F . Checking some specific (say, last)
blocks does not help, as explained in detail in the fur-
ther text. We thus have to design a scheme that lower
bounds the time-area product for the attacker, even if he
computes a slightly modified function.
4.1 Description of MTP
Consider a memory-hard functionF that satisfies Equa-
tion (2) (for instance, Argon2) with a single pass over the
memory producing T blocks with the internal compres-
sion function FI(X ,Y ) (parameterized by the challenge
I) and a cryptographic hash function H. We propose the
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Scheme AT cost Speed Verification Tradeoff Paral-sm Progress
Fast M/less -free
Dwork-Naor I [18] Low High Yes Yes Memoryless Yes Yes
Dwork-Naor II [17] High Low Yes No Memoryless Constr. Yes
Dwork-Naor III [19] Medium Low Yes No Exponential Constr. Yes
Hashcash/Bitcoin [8] Low High Yes Yes Memoryless Yes Yes
Pr.-of-Space [20]+Diff.test High Low Yes Yes Exponential No No
Litecoin Medium High Yes Yes Linear No Yes
Argon2-1GiB + Diff.test High High No No Exponential No Yes
Momentum [26] Medium High Yes Yes Attack [13, 39] Yes Yes
Cuckoo cycle [38] Medium [7] Medium Yes Yes Linear [7] Yes Partly
Equihash [13] High Medium Yes Yes Exponential Constr. Yes
Ethash [41] High Low Yes Partly Exponential Constr. Yes
MTP High High Yes Yes Exponential Constr. Yes
Table 2: Review of existing proofs of work. Litecoin utilizes scrypt with 128KiB of RAM followed by the difficulty
test). M/less – memoryless; constr. – constrained.
following non-interactive protocol for the Prover (Fig-
ure 1) in Algorithm 1, where L and d are security param-
eters. The average number of calls to F is T +2dL.
The verifier, equipped with F (and F as part of its
description) and H, runs Algorithm 2.
4.2 Cheating strategies
Let the computation-space tradeoff for H and the de-
fault memory value T be given by functions C(α) and
D(α) (Section 2).
Memory savings Suppose that a cheating prover wants
to reduce the AT cost by using αT memory for some
α < 1. First, he computes F (I) and Φ, making C(α)T
calls to F . Then for each N he has to get or recompute
L blocks using only αT stored blocks. The complexity
of this step is equal to the complexity of recomputing
random L blocks during the first computation of F . A
random block is recomputed by a tree of average size
C(α) and depth D(α). Therefore, to compute the proof-
of-work, a memory-saving prover has to make C(α)(T +
2dL) calls to F , so his amount of work grows by a factor
C(α).
Block modification The second cheating strategy is to
compute a different function F˜ 6= F . More precisely,
the cheater produces some blocks X [i′] (which we call
inconsistent as in [20]) not as specified by Equation (2)
Algorithm 1 MTP: Merkle-tree based Proof-of-Work.
Prover’s algorithm
Input: Challenge I, parameters L,d.
1. ComputeF (I) using FI and store its T blocks X [0],
X [1], . . ., X [T −1] in the memory.
2. Compute the root Φ of the Merkle hash tree (see
Appendix A).
3. Select nonce N.
4. Compute Y0 = H(I,Φ,N) where H is a crypto-
graphic hash function.
5. For 1≤ j ≤ L:
i j← Yj−1 (mod T );
Yj← H(Yj−1,X [i j]).
6. If YL has d trailing zeros, then (I,Φ,N,Z ) is the
proof-of-work, where Z consists of 3L openings
of blocks {X [i j− 1],X [φ(i j)],X [i j]} j together with
their indices, where the block X [i j] itself is not in-
cluded, only its opening. Otherwise go to Step 3.
Output: Proof (I,Φ,N,Z ).
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IArgon2
Merkle Tree
ΦN
H
i1iL
i1
H
iL
H
Y
d trailing zeros?
Nonce
Open 3L blocks
YesNo
Figure 1: MTP: Merkle-tree based Proof-of-Work with
light verification.
(e.g. by simply computing X [i′] = H(i′)). In contrast to
the verifiable computation approach, our protocol allows
a certain number of inconsistent blocks. Suppose that the
number of inconsistent blocks is εT , then the chance that
no inconsistent block is detected by L opened blocks is
γ = (1− ε)L.
Therefore, the probability for a proof-of-work with εT
inconsistent blocks to pass the opening test is γ . In other
words, the cheater’s time is increased by the factor 1/γ .
We note that it does not make sense to alter the blocks
after the Merkle tree computation, as any modified block
would fail the opening test.
Skewed blocks The third cheating strategy has been
inspired by [16]. Inconsistent blocks split the entire
chain of blocks into consistent chunks. An attacker tries
several candidates for the inconsistent block (the first in
the chunk) to make some next blocks in the chunk re-
ferring to inconsistent or stored blocks, so that he looks
them up with no penalty in the last phase of the computa-
tion. Suppose that the fraction of such additional blocks,
which we call skewed, is δ , so the average consistent
chunk of length 1/ε would have δ/ε such blocks. As
Algorithm 2 MTP: Verifier’s algorithm
Input: Proof (I,Φ,N,Z ), parameters L,d.
1. Compute Y0 = H(I,Φ,N).
2. For Z for 1≤ j ≤ L :
• Compute i j← Yj−1 (mod T );
• Retrieve X [i j−1],X [φ(i j)] from the proof;
• Compute X [i j] = FI(X [i j−1],X [φ(i j)]);
• Verify openings for X [i j − 1],X [φ(i j)],X [i j]
and their respective positions i j − 1,φ(i j), i j,
where φ(i j) is computed out of X [i j−1];
• Compute Yj← H(Yj−1,X [i j]).
3. Check whether YL has t trailing zeros.
Output: Yes/No.
each block would require 1α+ε attempts to make it re-
fer to inconsistent or stored blocks, each attempt costs at
least 1 call to F , and these efforts multiply up for one
chunk. Thus an attacker would make at least 1
(α+ε)δ/ε
extra calls to F per chunk to make it work.
Overall cheating penalties Let us accumulate the
three cheating strategies into one. Suppose that a cheater
stores αT blocks, additionally allows εT inconsistent
blocks, and makes δT other blocks to refer to either
stored or inconsistent ones. His penalty while comput-
ing T blocks will be at least C(α + ε + δ ) per block
plus extra (α+ ε)−δ/ε per chunk due to skewed blocks.
His penalty when looking up L blocks would be at least
C(α+ε+δ ) per block plus on average extra δ2ε calls per
skewed block. Thus he makes at least(
C(α+ ε+δ )+ ε
(α+ε)δ/ε
)
T +2dL(C(α+ ε+δ )+ δ
2
2ε )
γ
(6)
calls to F . The concrete values are determined by the
penalty function C(), which depends on F . The depth
penalty would be D(α+ ε+δ ) for T blocks and D(α+
ε+δ )+ δ
2
2ε for the L blocks.
4.3 Parallelism
Both honest prover and cheater can parallelize the com-
putation for 2t different nonces. However, the latency of
cheater’s computation will be higher, since each block
generates a recomputation tree of average depth D(α +
ε+δ ).
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4.4 Why simpler approach does not work:
grinding attack
Now we can explain in more details why the composition
of F and the difficulty test is not a good proof-of-work
even if some internal blocks ofH are opened. Suppose
that the proof is accepted if H(X [T ]) has certain number
d of trailing zeros. One would expect that a prover has to
try 2d distinct I on average and thus call F 2d times to
find a solution. However, a cheating prover can simply
try 2d values for X [T ] and find one that passes the test
in just 2d calls to H. Although X [T ] is now inconsistent,
it is unlikely to be selected among L blocks to open, so
the cheater escapes detection easily. Additionally check-
ing X [T ] would not resolve the problem since a cheater
would then modify the previous block, or X [φ(T )], or an
earlier block and then propagate the changes. A single
inconsistent block is just too difficult to catch4.
4.5 Modified Argon2
We now modify Argon2 to strengthen it against PoW-
specific cheaters. In the original Argon2 the compression
function works as
X [i]← F(X [i−1],X [φ(i)]).
We modify it so that it takes the parameters i (block in-
dex) and the hash of the original challenge H0. The new
compression function is denoted as
X [i]← FH0,i(X [i−1],X [φ(i)]).
and defined as follows (the difference to the original one
are shown in magenta.
1. Compute R← X [i−1]⊕X [φ(i)];
2. Treat R as a 8 × 8-matrix of 16-byte registers
R0,R1, . . . ,R63. Set R7 ← ψ(i), R8,9 ← H0. Here
ψ(i) is a multi-lane Argon2 block index defined in
Eq. 3. Assign R′← R.
3. Apply the modified Blake2b roundP first rowwise,
4We have not seen any formal treatment of this attack in the liter-
ature, but it appears to be known in the community. It is mentioned
in [32] and [4].
and then columnwise to get Z:
(Q0,Q1, . . . ,Q7)←P(R0,R1, . . . ,R7);
(Q8,Q9, . . . ,Q15)←P(R8,R9, . . . ,R15);
. . .
(Q56,Q57, . . . ,Q63)←P(R56,R57, . . . ,R63);
(Z0,Z8,Z16, . . . ,Z56)←P(Q0,Q8,Q16, . . . ,Q56);
(Z1,Z9,Z17, . . . ,Z57)←P(Q1,Q9,Q17, . . . ,Q57);
. . .
(Z7,Z15,Z23, . . . ,Z63)←P(Q7,Q15,Q23, . . . ,Q63).
Finally, output Z⊕R′:
F : (X ,Y ) → R=X⊕Y i,H0−−→ R′ P−→ Q P−→ Z → Z⊕R′.
The modified Argon2 algorithm uses the same index-
ing function φ , but discards 48 (out of 1024) block bytes
to reserve place for i and H0 as inputs to F . Therefore
the tradeoff attack quality grows by less than 5%.
4.6 MTP-Argon2
As a concrete application, we suggest a cryptocurrency
proof-of-work based on the modified Argon2d with 4
parallel lanes. The challenge I should be part of the aux-
iliary data U , whereas P and S can be set to full-zero 16-
byte strings. The ψ function that maps one-dimensional
indices to the two-dimensional Argon2 is given in Sec-
tion 3.1.
We aim to make this PoW unattractive for botnets, so
we suggest using 2 GiB of RAM, which is very notice-
able (and thus would likely alarm the user), while being
bearable for the regular user, who consciously decided
to use his desktop for mining. Argon2 runs in 0.6 cy-
cles per byte, so on a 3 GHz CPU a single call to 2-GiB
Argon2d would take 0.4 seconds. The Merkle tree com-
putation could take longer as we have to hash 2 GiB of
data splitted into 1 KiB blocks.
We suggest the full Blake2b for the hash function H
but the reduced 4-round Blake2b for the Merkle tree hash
function G, as currently no preimage or collision attack
exist on even a 3-round Blake2b (and very strong cryp-
tography is not necessary in this part of the Prover al-
gorithm). The 4-round Blake2b with 128-bit output thus
provides 64-bit security, which is even bigger than we
expected from a PoW. The reduced Blake2b would then
hash 2 GiB in 0.8 seconds on a single core, so with mul-
tiple cores we expect it to run within 0.3-0.4 seconds and
the total computation time being around 0.7 seconds, as
calls to 4-round Blake2b can be interleaved with memory
requests in Argon2.
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Determining optimal L Consider an ASIC-equipped
adversary who employs the cheating strategies given
in Section 4.2. His advantage in the time-area product
will differ for the initialization phase (when computing
T blocks of Argon2) and for the search phase (when he
searches for L blocks satisfying the difficulty test). The
difference is due to the overhead to compute the skewed
blocks. The relative importance of these two phases will
be determined by the ratio between the initialization time
and average lifetime of a challenge 5. Using data from
Table 1 and interpolating for memory fraction parameters
not given there, we can determine the adversarial advan-
tage by Equation (1) in both phases for fixed L,α,ε,δ .
Table 3 provides minimum L for given ratio (L-search
over T -fill) and maximum tolerable advantage.
Advantage\Ratio 0.1 1 10 100 1000
2 75 80 92 108 125
4 66 70 82 96 111
8 57 61 71 84 97
16 49 52 61 73 85
32 41 44 52 63 73
Table 3: Optimal number of openings as a function of
search-initialization ratio and tolerable adversary advan-
tage.
We suggest L = 70, so that the entire proof consists of
about 140 blocks and their openings (we open 3L blocks,
but X [i j] can be computed and does not need to be stored
in the proof). The opening for X [i j] mostly coincides
with that of X [i j − 1]: in 1/2 of cases the data is the
same, in 1/4 of cases an extra 128-bit block is needed,
in 1/8 – two extra blocks, thus 128 extra bits on average.
In total we need 140 ·1024+140 ·21.5 ·16≈ 187 KiB.
Future Proofing In order to foresee future proofing,
such as availability of cheaper RAM in the future, MTP
can be used with larger RAM sizes in the range of 2-8
GiB. Due to the very fast speed of Argon2 the initial-
ization would be still within a few seconds and thus the
PoW would be still progress-free. Moreover MTP mem-
ory capacity can be a function of the current difficulty
and the block number. For the same difficulty level, we
expect that the search-initialization ratio would decrease
proportionally to the increase of memory size. Table 3
implies that X-fold decrease in the ratio would require L
bigger by X elements, i.e. slightly.
5For instance, if initialization takes 1 second, and a block appears
every 20 seconds, the ratio is 20.
Comparison to other fast PoW Thanks to the miner
competition in Zcash, we know that the Equihash [13,24]
can require the attacker to have 150 MB of RAM while
producing 34 solutions per second on the i7-7700 CPU.
An increase in the memory requirements would at least
linearly increase the running time, so we conclude that a
version of Equihash which enforces an attacker to have 2
GB of RAM would not be able to fill the memory faster
than in 0.5 seconds, and probably much more as the data
would no longer fit into the L3 cache.
Itsuku [15] is a recently proposed design by Coelho
et al. It differs from MTP-Argon2 in smaller 64-byte
blocks, full-blown Blake2b for the internal compression
function F and two data-dependent memory accesses per
block (plus two more data-independent ones). Although
the benchmarks of Itsuku are not available, we could
guesstimate that the 32-fold increase in the number of
memory accesses would result in 10-15x decrease in per-
formance. Therefore, to fit in 1 second Itsuku would have
to be run with 100-200 MiB at most.
4.7 MTP as a tool for time-lock puzzles and
timestamping
The paradigm of inherently sequential computation was
developed by [14] in the application to CPU benchmark-
ing and [35] for timestamping, i.e. to certify that the doc-
ument was generated certain amount of time in the past.
Rivest et al. suggested time-lock puzzles for this purpose.
In our context, a time-lock puzzle solution is a proof-of-
work that has lower bound on the running time assuming
unlimited parallelism.
The verifier in [25, 35] selects a prime product N =
pq and asks the prover to compute the exponent 22
D
(mod N) fpr some D ≈ N. It is conjectured that the
prover who does not know the factors can not exponen-
tiate faster than do D consecutive squarings. In turn, the
verifier can verify the solution by computing the expo-
nent 2D modulo φ(N), which takes log(D) time. So far
the conjecture has not been refuted, but the scheme in-
herently requires a secret held by the verifier, and thus
is not suitable for proofs-of-work without secrets, as in
cryptocurrencies.
Time-lock puzzles without secrets were suggested by
Mahmoody et al. [27]. Their construction is a graph
of hash computations, which is based on depth-robust
graphs similarly to [20]. The puzzle is a deterministic
graph such that removing any constant fraction of nodes
keeps its depth above the constant fraction of the original
one (so the parallel computation time is lower bounded).
A Merkle tree is put atop of it with its root determining
a small number of nodes to open. Therefore, a cheater
who wants to compute the graph in less time has to sub-
vert too many nodes and is likely to be caught. As [20],
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the construction by Mahmoody et al., if combined with
the difficulty filter, is subject to the grinding attack de-
scribed above.
The MTP-Argon2 construction can be viewed as
a time-lock puzzle and an improvement over these
schemes. First, the difficulty filter is explicitly based on
the grinding attack, which makes it a legitimate way to
solve the puzzle. Secondly, it is much faster due to high
speed of Argon2d. The time-lock property comes from
the fact that the computation chain can not be parallelized
as the graph structure is not known before the computa-
tion.
Suppose that MTP-Argon2 is parallelized by the ad-
ditional factor of R so that each core computes a chain
of length about T/R. Let core j compute j-th (out of
R) chain, chronologically. Then by step i each core has
computed i blocks and has not computed T/R− i blocks,
so the probability that core j requests a block that has not
been computed is
( j−1)(T/R− i)
( j−1)T/R+ i ≤
( j−1)(T/R− i)
jT/R
.
Summing by all i, we obtain that core j misses at least
T (1−1/ j)
2R , so the total fraction of inconsistent blocks is
about 0.5− lnR2R . Therefore, ε quickly approaches 0.5,
which is easily detectable. We thus conclude that a par-
allel implementation of MTP-Argon2 is likely to fail the
Merkle tree verification.
4.8 Resistance to attacks specific for MTP-
Argon2 v1.0
Dinur and Nadler [16] and Bevand [10] demonstrated
some vulnerabilities in the original design of MTP. We
now explore these vulnerabilities and show that they are
not present in the current version of MTP.
• In the original version of MTP the challenge I was
not used in the internal compression function F .
As a result, an attacker could reuse [16, Section
4.1] most of the state blocks from another challenge
claiming that they are derived from the current chal-
lenge. Furthermore, after some (moderately hard)
amount of precomputation an attacker could pro-
duce [16, Section 4.3] chunks of blocks for which
the function φ outputs indices from a certain range
R, so that only blocks from R are stored. These
chunks could be used for multiple challenges and
thus could amortize the precomputation cost.
Now I undergoes a collision-resistant hash function
to produce H0, and this hash of I is used in all calls
to F . As a result, the block pairs (X [φ(i j)],X [i j−
1]) from previous proofs would produce a differ-
ent challenge-dependent X [i j] and thus would fail
the Merkle tree verification. Note that verifying the
opening of X [1], as suggested in [16], does not pre-
vent the attack as an attacker could recompute as
many first blocks as he wants and then reuse the rest.
• In the original version of MTP the openings for
blocks X [i j] were not provided by the Prover. As
a result, an attacker could take [16, Section 4.1] ar-
bitrary values for all X [i] as X [i j] was used only to
compute Yj, but was not verified against the Merkle
root. As now the opening for X [i j] is provided
(though the block itself does not need to be stored),
this attack no longer works.
• In the original version of MTP the block index i was
not used in F . As a result, in the case of multi-lane
Argon2 an adversary could use the same blocks for
all lanes in the first segment as only the current lane
can be referred to by φ in the first segment ( [10, At-
tack 1]). For the other segments, it was apparently
possible to generate a chunk of size m with com-
plexity 2m/2 so that the function φ for these indices
maps to the other lanes ( [10, Attack 4]). Then the
chunk can be concatenated in multiple copies since
φ still maps to the other lanes. As each compres-
sion function computation now uses block index i,
the attack no longer works.
• In the original MTP specification it was not asserted
(though was implied) in the verifier’s algorithm that
φ(i j) and i j − 1 are the positions with respect to
which the opening is verified. As a result an at-
tacker could provide identical openings for every j
( [10, Attack 2]). The specification now explicitly
requires that opened block positions are provided in
the proof and are verified.
5 Memory-hard encryption on low-
entropy keys
5.1 Motivation
In this section6 we approach standard encryption from
the memory-hardness perspective. A typical approach to
hard-drive encryption is to derive the master key from the
user password and then use it to encrypt chunks of data in
a certain mode of operation such as XTS [29]. The major
threat, as to other password-based security schemes, are
low-entropy passwords. An attacker, who gets access to
the hard drive encrypted with such password, can deter-
mine the correct key and then decrypt within short time.
A countermeasure could be to use a memory-hard
function for the key derivation, so that the trial keys can
6This section didn’t change compared to the original USENIX Se-
curity paper.
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be produced only on memory-rich machines. However,
the trial decryption could still be performed on special
memoryless hardware given these keys. We suggest a
more robust scheme which covers this type of adversaries
and eventually requires that the entire attack code have
permanent access to large memory.
5.2 Requirements
We assume the following setting, which is inspired by
typical disk-encryption applications. The data consists
of multiple chunks Q ∈Q, which can be encrypted and
decrypted independently. The only secret that is avail-
able to the encryption scheme E is the user-input pass-
word P ∈P , which has sufficiently low entropy to be
memorized (e.g., 6 lowercase symbols). The encryption
syntax is then as follows:
E : P×S ×Q→ C ,
where S ∈S is associated data, which may contain salt,
encryption nonce or IV, chunk identifier, time, and other
secondary input; and C ∈ C is ciphertext. S serves both
to simplify ciphertext identification (as it is public) and
to ensure certain cryptographic properties. For instance,
unique salt or nonce prevents repetition of ciphertexts for
identical plaintexts. We note that in some settings due to
storage restriction the latter requirement can be dropped.
Decryption then is naturally defined and we omit its for-
mal syntax.
In our proposal we do not restrict the chunk size. Even
though it can be defined for chunks as small as disk sec-
tors, the resistance to cracking attacks will be higher for
larger chunks, up to a megabyte long.
A typical attack setting is as follows. An attacker ob-
tains the encrypted data via some malicious channel or
installs malware and then tries different passwords to de-
crypt it. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the
plaintext contains sufficient redundancy so that a suc-
cessful guess can be identified easily. Therefore, the ad-
versary tries D passwords from his dictionary D ⊂P .
Let T be the time needed for the fastest decryption op-
eration that provides partial knowledge of plaintext suf-
ficient to discard or remember the password, and A0 be
the chip area needed to implement this operation. Then
the total amount of work performed by the adversary is
W = D ·T ·A0.
At the same time, the time to encrypt T ′ for a typical user
should not be far larger than T . Our goal is to maximize
W with keeping T ′ the same or smaller.
The memory-hard functions seem to serve perfectly
for the purpose of maximizing W . However, it remains
unclear how to combine such function F with E to get
memory-hard encryption (MHE).
Now we formulate some additional features that
should be desirable for such a scheme:
• The user should be able to choose the requested
memory size A independently of the chunk length
|Q|. Whereas the chunk length can be primarily de-
termined by the CPU cache size, desirable process-
ing speed, or the hard drive properties, the memory
size determines the scheme’s resistance to cracking
attacks.
• The memory can be allocated independently for
each chunk or reused. In the former case the user
can not allocate too much memory as the mas-
sive decryption would be too expensive. How-
ever, for the amounts of memory comparable to
the chunk size the memory-hard decryption should
take roughly as much as memoryless decryption. If
the allocated memory is reused for distinct chunks,
much more memory can be allocated as the alloca-
tion time can be amortized. However, the decryp-
tion latency would be quite high. We present both
options in the further text.
• Full ciphertext must be processed to decrypt a single
byte. This property clearly makes T larger since
the adversary would have to process an entire chunk
to check the password. At the same time, for disk
encryption it should be fine to decrypt in the “all-or-
nothing” fashion, as the decryption time would still
be smaller than the user could wait.
• Encryption should be done in one pass over data.
It might sound desirable that the decryption should
be done in one pass too. However, this would con-
tradict the previous requirement. Indeed, if the de-
cryption can be done in one pass, then the first bytes
of the plaintext can be determined without the last
bytes of the ciphertext7.
• Apart from the memory parameter, the total time
needed to allocate this memory should be tunable
too. It might happen that the application does not
have sufficient memory but does have time. In this
case, the adversary can be slowed down by making
several passes over the memory during its initial-
ization (the memory-hard function that we consider
support this feature).
Our next and final requirement comes from adversary’s
side. When the malware is used, the incoming network
connection and memory for this malware can be limited.
Thus, it would be ideal for the attacker if the memory-
intensive part can be delegated to large machines under
7The similar argument is made for the online authenticated ciphers
in [22].
11
attacker’s control, such as botnets. If we just derived the
secret-key K for encryption as the output of the memory-
hard hash function F , this would be exactly this case.
An adversary would then run F for dictionary D on his
own machine, produce the set K of keys, and supply
them to malware (recall that due to low entropy there
would be only a handful of these keys). Thus the final
requirement should be the following:
• During decryption, it should be impossible to del-
egate the entire memory-hard computation to the
external device without accessing the ciphertext.
Therefore, there could be no memory-hard precom-
putation.
5.3 Our scheme
Our scheme is based on a recent proposal by Za-
verucha [42], who addresses similar properties in the
scheme based on Rivest’s All-or-Nothing transform
(ANT). However, the scheme in [42] does not use an ex-
ternal memory-hard function, which makes it memory
requirements inevitably bound to the chunk size. Small
chunks but large memory is impossible in [42].
Our proposal is again based on the All-or-Nothing
transformation, though we expect that similar proper-
ties can be obtained with deterministic authenticated en-
cryption scheme as a core primitive. The chunk length
q (measured in blocks using by F ) and memory size
M ≥ q are the parameters as well as some blockcipher
E (possibly AES). First, we outline the scheme where
the memory is allocated separately for each chunk. The
reader may also refer to Figure 2.
The underlying idea is to use both the header and the
body blocks to produce the ciphertext. In tun, to recom-
pute the body blocks both the ciphertext and the header
must be available during trial decryption.
The version of the MHE scheme which allocates the
same memory for multiple chunks is very similar. The
S input is ignored at the beginning, so that the header
memory blocks do not depend on the data. Instead, we
set K0 = H(X0,S), so that the body blocks are affected
by S and M, and thus are different for every chunk. In
this case the body blocks have to be stored separately
and should not overwrite the header blocks for t > 1.
Let us verify that the scheme in Algorithm 3 satisfies
the properties we listed earlier:
• The allocated memory size M can be chosen inde-
pendently of the chunk length q (as long as M > q).
• The body memory blocks are allocated and pro-
cessed for each chunk independently. In addition,
the header blocks are also processed independently
for each chunk in the single-chunk version.
Algorithm 3 Memory-hard encryption with independent
memory allocation (for each chunk).
Input: Password P, memory size M, associated data S,
chunk Q, number of iterations t, memory-hard function
F (preferably Argon2), blockcipher E, cryptographic
hash function H (e.g. SHA-3).
1. RunF on (P,S) with input parameters M and t but
fill only M−q blocks (the header) in the last itera-
tion. Let X0 be the last memory block produced by
F .
2. Produce K0 = H(X0) — the first session key.
3. Generate a random session key K1.
4. Generate the remaining blocks X1, X2, . . ., Xq (body)
for F as follows. We assume that each chunk M
consists of smaller blocks m1, m2, . . ., mq of length
equal to the block size ofF . For each i≥ 1:
• Encrypt Xi−1 by E in the ECB mode under K1
and get the intermediate ciphertext block C′i .
• Add the chunk data: C′′i =C′i ⊕mi.
• Encrypt C′′i under K0 in the CBC mode and
produce the final ciphertext block Ci.
• Modify the memory: Xi−1← Xi−1⊕C′′i .
• Generate the block Xi according to the speci-
fication of F . In Argon2, the modified Xi−1
and some another block X [φ(Xi−1)] would be
used.
5. After the entire chunk is encrypted, encrypt also the
key K1 :
Ct+1 = EK0(H(Xt)⊕K1).
Output: C1, . . . ,Ct+1.
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Figure 2: MHE: Disk encryption using memory-hard function Argon2.
• In order to decrypt a single byte of the ciphertext,
an adversary would have to obtain K1, which can be
done only by runningF up to the final block, which
requires all C′′i , which are in turn must be derived
from the ciphertext blocks.
• Encryption needs one pass over data, and decryp-
tion needs two passes over data.
• The total time needed to allocate and fill the header
is tunable.
• The computation of the body memory blocks dur-
ing decryption can not be delegated, as it requires
knowledge both of the header and the ciphertext. It
might be possible to generate the header on an ex-
ternal machine, but then random access to its blocks
to decrypt the ciphertext is required.
We note that properties 1, 5, and 6 are not present in [42].
Security First, we address traditional CPA security.
We do not outline the full proof here, just the basic steps.
We assume that the adversary does not have access to the
internals of Argon2, and that blockcipher E is a secure
PRF. Next, we assume collision-resistance of the com-
pression function F used in F . Given that, we prove
that all the memory blocks are distinct, which yields the
CPA security for C′. From the latter we deduce the CPA
security for the final ciphertext. We note that in the case
when the collision-resistance of F can not be guaranteed,
we may additionally require that Xi undergo hashing by
a cryptographic hash function H ′ before encryption, so
that the plaintext blocks are still distinct. All these prop-
erties hold up to the birthday bound of the blockcipher.
Next, we figure out the tradeoff security. The genuine
decrypting user is supposed to spend M memory blocks
for F and q memory blocks to store the plaintext and
intermediate variables (if the ciphertext can be overwrit-
ten, then these q blocks are not needed). Suppose that
an adversary wants to use αM memory for header and
body. Then each missing block, if asked during decryp-
tion, must be recomputed making C(α) calls to F . The
best such strategy for Argon2, described in [11], yields
C(α) that grows exponentially in 1/α . For example, us-
ing 1/5 of memory, an adversary would have to make
344 times as many calls to F , which makes a memory-
reducing encryption cracking inefficient even on special
hardware.
Performance We suggest taking l = 4 in Argon2 in or-
der to fill the header faster using multiple cores, which
reportedly takes 0.7 cpb (about the speed of AES-GCM
and AES-XTS). The body has to be filled sequentially
as the encryption process is sequential. As AES-CBC
is about 1.3 cpb, and we use two of it, the body phase
should run at about 4 cpb. In a concrete setting, suppose
that we tolerate 0.1 second decryption time (about 300
Mcycles) for the 1-MiB chunk. Then we can take the
header as large as 256 MiB, as it would be processed in
170 Mcycles + 4 Mcycles for the body phase.
6 Conclusion
We have introduced the new paradigm of egalitarian
computing, which suggests amalgamating arbitrary com-
putation with a memory-hard function to enhance the
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security against off-line adversaries equipped with pow-
erful tools (in particular with optimized hardware). We
have reviewed password hashing and proofs of work as
applications where such schemes are already in use or
are planned to be used. We then introduce two more
schemes in this framework. The first one is MTP, the
progress-free proof-of-work scheme with fast verifica-
tion based on the memory-hard function Argon2, the
winner of the Password Hashing Competition. The sec-
ond scheme pioneers the memory-hard encryption — the
security enhancement for password-based disk encryp-
tion, also based on Argon2.
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A Merkle hash trees
We use Merkle hash trees in the following form. A
prover P commits to T blocks X [1],X [2], . . . ,X [T ] by
computing the hash tree where the blocks X [i] are at
leaves at depth logT and nodes compute hashes of their
branches. For instance, for T = 4 and hash function G
prover P computes and publishes
Φ= G(G(X [1],X [2]),G(X [3],X [4])).
Prover stores all blocks and all intermediate hashes. In
order to prove that he knows, say, X [5] for T = 8, (or to
open it) he discloses the hashes needed to reconstruct the
path from X [5] to Φ:
open(X [5]) = (X [5],X [6],g78 = G(X [7],X [8]),
g1234 = G(G(X [1],X [2]),G(X [3],X [4])),Φ),
so that the verifier can make all the computations. If G
is collision-resistant, it is hard to open any block in more
than one possible way.
B Difference to the original MTP
The version 1.2 of MTP-Argon2 presented in this paper
differs from the original version 1.0 in the following:
• The Argon2 compression function is modified
where 3 16-byte blocks of its intermediate block R
are replaced with the block index i and input hash
H0.
• The Merkle tree opening for X [i j] is now in-
cluded, though the block itself doesn’t need to
be included, since it is computed from the blocks
(X [φ(i j)],X [i j−1]). Opening paths of X [i j−1] and
X [i j] share most of the nodes, which can be used by
efficient implementation;
• The positions of opened blocks are now included in
the proof and are verified;
• 4-round Blake2 is used in the Merkle tree genera-
tion;
• New ”skewed blocks” attack strategy is presented
in Sect. 4.2. However it does not effect the secu-
rity parameter recommendations for MTP-Argon2,
while it might effect other MTP-based PoWs.
C Memoryless computation of Itsuku
Itsuku [15] is a new proof-of-work (PoW) proposal by
Coelho, Larroche, and Colin. The authors make an at-
tempt to fix vulnerabilities in the original version of
MTP. This PoW, shortly, works as follows (using the
MTP notation):
• Independently fill p lanes of memory, T blocks total
(64 bytes per block):
X [i] = F(X [φ1(i)],X [φ2(i)],X [φ3(i)],X [φ4(i)]),
where the φ functions always point to the computed
blocks of the same lane. There φ1(i) = i−1,φ4(i) =
7i/8 (within the lane) and φ2,φ3 are data-dependent;
• Compute the Merkle tree over X ;
• Using Merkle tree root Φ and nonce N, compute
L = 9 indices and open such blocks if the difficulty
condition is met.
The compression function F is an iteration of full regular
Blake2.
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Computing Itsuku with little memory Our “skewed
blocks” cheating strategy can be applied to Itsuku. How-
ever, the process is different for the initialization (T -fill)
and iteration (L-search) phases.
In the initialization phase the attacker stores no blocks
in memory so α = 0. He also makes every 1/ε-th block
inconsistent, that he can look up blocks by i/8 steps back
at cost 2/ε2. Finally, he ensures that all the other 1/ε−1
blocks in a consistent chunk point to inconsistent block
of this or other chunks (thus ε + δ = 1) by functions
φ2,φ3. In each chunk the attacker has to try
ε2−
2
ε
inconsistent blocks to satisfy this condition. Each block
needs extra 1/ε calls to F to compute the reference block
by φ4, so the amortized overhead is ε2−
2
ε .
In the search phase the attacker no longer needs to
try many inconsistent blocks, but he has to look up the
blocks referenced by φ4. As every 1/ε-th block is incon-
sistent, the maximum depth of the lookup recomputation
tree is 1/ε and the recomputation penalty is 2/ε2.
Finally, an attacker has to compute the opening for the
Merkle tree he does not store. However, he simply re-
computes it from the beginning. Since he already found
good inconsistent blocks, this step has negligible cost
compared to the initialization phase.
The attacker will not be caught with probability (1−
ε)9 (as L = 9). Thus the total computational overhead
per block for computing the T blocks of memory and not
being caught is
ε2−
2
ε
(1− ε)9 ,
which reaches minimum at ε = 0.43 and equals 1475.
Therefore, using 1475 extra cores and virtually no mem-
ory, we can compute the initialization phase of Itsuku
PoW.
The computational overhead for the search phase is
only 2/ε2 = 10. Thus for a reasonable challenge-
lifetime/initialization ratios of 10 or 100 the total num-
ber of cores for the attacker is about 100 or less. A more
careful analysis with an analogue of Table 1 would bring
more accurate estimates.
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